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I. INTRODUCTION
In urban combat, it is said that there are two kinds of people on the bat-
tlefield-marksmen and targets.' In this article, I wish to address an issue im-
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District of Virginia, 2005-2006; J.D., The George Washington University Law School. Special
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portant to both parties: double-tapping. Simply stated, double-tapping is the
practice of shooting into bodies that appear dead or wounded to ensure that they
are, in fact, dead. While the laws of war do not expressly prohibit the practice,
they do limit it-offering protection for the wounded and dead while enabling
soldiers to protect themselves by shooting those still engaged in hostilities.
The realities of war have never reflected a chess match, where parties to
a conflict, clad in their respective colors, meet upon a predetermined field of
battle and operate according to predetermined rules. Rather, the parties in-
volved in a conflict color the style and substance of battle regardless of the exis-
tence of treaties, laws, codes, or customs. Until recently, the laws of war were
only enforceable insofar as states possessed the will and desire to prosecute their
2own combatants. Parties mostly refrained from violating the laws of war for
fear of reprisal.3 Where the identity and political structure of the enemy is less
than clear, however, these enforcement mechanisms fail to create any incentive
to follow the laws of war. Today, the uniformed, organized, and politically ac-
countable armies of the more-developed world frequently encounter non-
uniformed, unaccountable, and often unidentifiable bands of combatants.
4
Without enforcement mechanisms policing one party to a conflict, the
question of whether countries like the United States may violate the laws of war
in reprisal presents a difficult question. David Hume once wrote, "[a]nd were a
civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who observed no rules of war, the
former must also suspend their observance of them, where they no longer serve
to any purpose; and must render every action or recounter as bloody and perni-
cious as possible to the first aggressors."5 While Hume's exhortation to resort to
unrestricted violence may seem simple enough, it assumes complete knowledge
of who is the aggressor and who is engaged in battle. This categorization is a
central question in determining whether double-tapping violates the laws of war
and a question often faced by many soldiers in combat.
This article will discuss the history and purpose of double-tapping and
the laws of war it implicates, focusing on the protections offered to the dead and
I MICHAEL T. HALL & MICHAEL T. KENNEDY, MOUT TRAINING 75TH REGIMENT: THE URBAN
AREA DURING SUPPORT MISSIONS 541, 550 (Mar. 30, 2000), http://www.rand.org/ publica-
tions/CF/CF162/CFI 62. appp.pdf.
2 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317. This clause requires the signatory parties to enact legislation necessary
to provide effective penal sanctions and to bring persons who have committed grave breaches
before their own courts for punishment. Id.
3 See Waldemar A. Solf & Edward R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal Sanctions Under Proto-
col I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 205, 205 (1977).
4 This is not to say that this type of warfare is a modem development. Guerilla-style warfare
is well-documented throughout history. Examples come from as early as the Second Punic War
(218-210 B.C.), where Roman dictator Fabius Maximus's employed guerilla tactics against the
oncoming armies of Hannibal.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss3/10
SHOOT FIRST, ASK QUESTIONS LATER
wounded through the Geneva Conventions and the International Committee of
the Red Cross Rules.
Specifically, I will begin by describing some historical examples of the
use of double-tapping and briefly discuss the justifications for such uses. In Part
III I will analyze the current laws of war related to double-tapping and their
historical precursors. These laws include the protections afforded the wounded
and dead, the principle of distinction, and the prohibition on perfidy. Finally,
Part IV will analyze the legality of double-tapping in context, focusing on two
events where American forces fired on wounded or dead Iraqi troops during the
Second Gulf War.
II. THE USE AND JUSTIFICATION OF DOUBLE-TAPPING
Double-tapping is the practice of firing into bodies, regardless of their
current participation in hostilities, for the purpose of making sure the targets are
dead. Although this practice takes place almost exclusively with gunfire in the
modem world, this was not always the case. While not necessarily called "dou-
ble-tapping," the practice of making sure that an enemy on the ground is dead is
a long-standing practice in the history of warfare. Double-tapping has been
used throughout history for many reasons: tactics, fear, hatred, safety, econom-
ics, and mercy.
A. Killing the Wounded: From Waterloo to the Gulf War
While the laws of war have offered significantly more protections to the
wounded, sick, and dead over time, double-tapping, or rudimentary versions of
it, has remained in constant practice. The following examples of killing the
wounded illustrate the practice before and after the invention of modem weap-
onry and the formulation of the modem laws of war.
While fighting the French at Waterloo, British troops commonly struck
at bodies lying on the ground.6 One British colonel stated that, "[w]hen charg-
ing at Waterloo, a French trumpeter was passed lying on the ground. Few of the
regiment forbore to have a slash at the fallen enemy, as they galloped past.",
7
The French were not innocent of the practice either. In his memoirs, John Kin-
caid recounted how the French troops would pause in retreat only to stab
wounded troops: "[i]t made me mad to see the [French], in their retreat, stooping
and stabbing at our wounded men. How I wished that I had been blessed with
Omnipotent power for a moment, that I might have blighted them.",
8
During the Twentieth Century, the use of double-tapping persisted,
notwithstanding the increasing accuracy and effectiveness of modem weapons.
6 CHARLES DALTON, THE WATERLOO ROLL CALL 53 (1890).
7 Id. The colonel continued, "I did not slash at him... [the trumpeter] slashed at me!" Id.
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In World War I, both the Axis and Allied powers used bayonets to stab enemies
on the ground as they advanced to protect their flanks.
During an advance on the battlefield, some British battalions
had the deliberate policy of bayoneting the wounded enemy en
passant to neutralise them. And there are reliable reports that
wounded, and wound-faking, enemy soldiers fired at the backs
of advancing British soldiers. There are also personal accounts
by soldiers of both sides of bayoneting unarmed POW's, in and
behind the lines, although this was rarely admitted officially by
either side.9
Double-tapping continued in the Second World War, practiced by all
the parties to the conflict. The German, Soviet, Japanese, British, and American
troops all utilized the practice to ensure that those enemy soldiers who appeared
to be dead on the battlefield were actually dead. The practice was apparently so
common for the Soviets that one observer wrote the following: "Killing cap-
tured and often wounded Germans was so pervasive that it raises the question of
whether it was an inherent, spontaneous characteristic of the Russians, who
dominated the field armies, or part of a systematic policy by the Soviet Com-
munists to encourage resistance and maintain control over the Red Army." 10
Accounts from the front lines against Japan show that the Japanese
commonly fired into dead or wounded soldiers on the battlefield. One such
account tells the following story:
They had been ambushed, two of his companions were killed at
once, he and the third had run for the cover they never reached
as the Japs dropped them with fire on the way. He had then seen
th6 Japs shoot again, bayonet the three dead men, and then start
for him. He played dead, so they shot him and passed on."
After World War II and the subsequent ratification of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the practice was still evident throughout the world. Long-time
American veterans have reported that the practice is more common than the
9 David Payne, The Cult of the Bayonet in the British Army on the Western Front in the Great
War (2005), http://www.westernfront.co.uklthegreatwar/articles/researchlbritishbayonet.htm.
10 RUSSELL STOLFI, HITLER'S PANZERS EAST: WORLD WAR II REINTERPRETED 91 (1993). Quot-
ing from American and German battlefield reports, Stolfi cites the several examples of Soviet
practices during World War II. See id. "German prisoners ... mishandled by Russians... other
prisoners bestially murdered. Investigation to follow." Id. "[E]leven wounded German soldiers
who had fallen into Russian hands in a counterattack were murdered by stab wounds in the back."
Id.
11 RUSSELL CARTWRIGHT STROup, Letter of June 24, 1944, in LETTERS FROM THE PACIFIC: A
COMBAT CHAPLAIN IN WORLD WAR 11 (2000).
[Vol. 108
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military would like to admit. 12 "[Gary] Solis, a former Marine lieutenant colo-
nel who teaches the law of war at West Point and has written two books on Ma-
rine war crimes in Vietnam, said he believes the practice of 'double-tapping'
fighters 'just to make sure' they are dead is a common practice among ... Ma-
rines in Iraq."'
13
Solis also noted that West Point professors have tried to impress upon
cadets that "finishing off' wounded enemies was unacceptable, regardless of
whether the wounded is a prisoner of war or an enemy combatant. 14 In the Sec-
ond Gulf War, several examples of double-tapping occurred, two of which will
be described in detail in the following section. American and British forces
chose to double-tap the dead, wounded, and those who appeared to surrender
during certain battlefield situations. Where Iraqi soldiers "continue[d] to use
deception.... dress[ed] in civilian clothes or pretend[ed] to surrender, and then
unexpectedly pull[ed] out a gun and start[ed] shooting" the American and Brit-
ish forces would double-tap.15
B. Double-Tapping during the Second Gulf War
1. Thunder Run
Evidence that the practice persists today comes from the April 5, 2003,
American invasion of Baghdad-an operation called "Thunder Run."' 6 During
the advance into the city, one reporter, David Zucchino, was embedded with
Task Force 4-64 of the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized). He
described the push to Baghdad, compiled reports of the brigade commanders
involved in the battle, and wrote about the problems American forces encoun-
tered because of their uncertainty about the status of dead and wounded Iraqi
soldiers.1
7
On April 4, 2003, brigade commander Colonel David Perkins sum-
moned Army Lieutenant Colonel Eric Schwartz and told him that he was to at-
tack Baghdad the next morning.' 8 This was surprising because no American
troops had set foot into the Iraqi capital yet, the original plan of attack had
called for an airborne assault, and his armored divisions had trained for desert
12 Darrin Mortenson, Pendleton Marine investigated for killing wounded prisoner in Fallujah,
N.C. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2004, at Al.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Retired Brig. Gen. David Grange, Grange: Iraqis fight with 'economy of force,' Mar. 25,
2003, http://www.cnn.comV2003/US/03/25/ sprj.irq.general.grange/.
16 Thomas E. Ricks, Old-Style Battles Are Giving Way to 'Checkpoint War,' WASH. POST, Apr.
6, 2003, at A26.
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combat, not urban warfare. 19 The next morning, however, Schwartz advanced
toward the city, a prelude to a three-day battle for the capital.2 °
The race to Baghdad created mass confusion among the Iraqi soldiers.2'
At first, many unsuspecting combatants were surprised and easily gunned
down.22 After the initial shock, however, the Iraqi forces began to organize.23 A
tank near the front of the column was disabled at a highway interchange, stop-
ping the entire column on the highway.24 After the column was forced to slow
down, Zucchino reported that "[flighters who appeared to be dead or wounded
were suddenly leaping up and firing at the backs of American vehicles.
Schwartz ordered his gunners to 'double-tap,' to shoot anybody they saw moving
near a weapon. 25 Schwartz commented on the practice after the battle, stating
that "[i]f it was a confirmed kill, they'd let it go .... [I]f it wasn't, they'd tap it
again. We were checking our work.
26
2. Shooting the Wounded in Fallujah
In addition to Thunder Run, another example of the use of double-
tapping by American soldiers in Iraq gained much attention in the press. On
November 13, 2004, NBC News correspondent Kevin Sites, embedded in the
Third Battalion, First Regiment of the First Marine Division, videotaped an
American soldier as he shot an Iraqi prisoner in a Fallujah mosque.27 Mr. Sites
reported that Iraqi soldiers fired upon a different Marine unit a day earlier from
the same mosque.28 That unit stormed the mosque, killed ten men, and wounded
five others. 29 According to the first unit, the combatants were armed with
rocket-propelled grenades and AK-47 rifles. 30 After the marines attacked the
mosque, they tended to the wounded and rejoined the effort to take Fallujah
from insurgents.3
The next day Mr. Sites and his unit came upon the mosque, entered it
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the background.32 The American soldier yelled that one of the Iraqis in the
mosque was pretending to be dead.3 3 The video showed the American soldier
pointing his rifle at the Iraqi on the floor, and, although the video went dark, a
shot can be heard in the background. 34 The blacked-out portion was later re-
vealed to some members of the network pool, showing that the American soldier
hit the combatant in the upper body.35 Blood spatters appeared on the wall be-
hind him and the combatant's body went limp.
36
After the incident and an accompanying firestorm of controversy, the
United States military began an investigation into the shooting.37 According to
the Pentagon, the inquiry focused on whether the "marine believed he was act-
ing in self-defense when he yelled that the Iraqi was only pretending to be dead
and fired at the prone body. 38 Investigators concluded that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to charge the marine and that it was possible that the marine
thought his life was in danger.39 The reporter wrote an open letter to the Marine
Corps several days after the incident stating that "[o]bserving all of this as an
experienced war reporter who always bore in mind the dark perils of this con-
flict, even knowing the possibilities of mitigating circumstances-it appeared to
me very plainly that something was not right."4
While many questioned the actions of this particular marine and his
unit, it is necessary to detail some of the background regarding the assault on
Fallujah with respect to the practices of the combatants. Many sources reported
32 Id.
3 Id. See also Tom Bowman, Videotape reveals war's impact, BALT. SUN, Nov. 17, 2004, at
4A ("'He's (expletive) faking he's dead!' 'Yeah, he's breathing,' another Marine is heard say-
ing.").
34 Associated Press, supra note 27.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Eric Schmitt, Bodies of 4 Iraqis Flown to U.S. For Autopsies in Fallujah Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2004, at A9.
38 Id.
39 Andrew Buncombe, Marine Who Shot Dead Wounded Iraqi on Video to Escape Charges in
Fallujah Will Not Be Prosecuted, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 25, 2005, at 27.
40 Id. For other commentary and reports of the incident see Thomas J. Raleigh, A Lesson in
War and Humanity, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2004, at A29; Evan Wright, Dead-Check in Fallujah,
VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 30, 2004, at 22; Nick Fusco, Marines Doing the Dirty Work, JOURNAL
NEWS, Jan. 7, 2005, at 4B; Jeremy Iggers, The Ethics of War; Reflecting on Iraq in Years to
Come, the World Will Likely Ask of Us: Did We Know? Did We Care? Did We Speak Out?, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 6, 2005, at 1AA ("Marines call executing wounded combatants 'dead-
checking.'); Sgt. Jay T. Blass, Time to Present Reality, ARMY TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, at 53; Wil-
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that insurgents used mosques to launch attacks, faked surrender, pretended to be
injured, and booby-trapped their own dead.4'
These examples of double-tapping evidence some of the reasons why
42soldiers engage in the practice. They could be acting out of mercy, vengeance,
caution, or strategy. The framework within which an act of double-tapping oc-
curs is very important, as some uses may be legitimate while others a violation
of the laws of war. The history and current usage provide an important bench-
mark within which to view the practice and provide important examples of why
the practice exists and how soldiers employ it in the field.
It is interesting to note that while the laws of war have become increas-
ingly complex, the practice of double-tapping has not appeared to wane. Most
likely, this failure is not necessarily the result of an ineffective legal regime.
Rather, it probably results from the realities of policing and enforcing a battle-
field tactic practiced by individual soldiers which, depending on the specific
circumstances of a confrontation, may or may not be legitimate. The nature of
the battlefield confrontation and its effect on the legitimacy of the practice are
addressed below.43
III. HISTORY AND APPLICABILITY OF THE LAWS OF WAR
"The law of war recognizes that the purpose of the military in wartime
is killing people and breaking things. It seems to me that killing people and
breaking things has given way to feeding people and fixing things."
44
In this section I will first describe the historical bases for the modem
laws of war related to double-tapping, including protections for the wounded
and sick and prohibitions on unnecessary suffering. Next, I will analyze the
modem laws of war related to double-tapping: protections for the wounded and
sick, respect for the dead, the principle of distinction, and the prohibition on
41 See, e.g., Rowan Scarborough, Marine Charged in Killing of Iraqis, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2005, at Al; Dennis Rogers, War's Tales Need Telling, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec.
8, 2004, at B I (pointing out that booby-trapped bodies are not unheard of in warfare as American
soldiers encountered them in Korea, Vietnam, the first Gulf War, and in Afghanistan); Amanda
Ripley et al., A Shot Seen Round The World; A Marine Fires on a Wounded Man in a Fallujah
Mosque, and the World Asks: Was it a War Crime?, TIME, Nov. 29, 2004, at 38 ("This strain of
war may be unimaginable to civilians Stateside, but it is nevertheless what the troops are trained
to manage.").
42 See, e.g., Edmund Sanders, Mercy and Murder at Issue in Iraq Death, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5,
2004, at Al. Sanders described an incident where two American soldiers shot an Iraqi teenager
who was severely wounded. Id. The soldiers "watched him moan and writhe in pain until they
could stand it no longer." Id. They then shot the man out of mercy. Id.
43 See infra Section IV.
44 Maj. Lisa L. Turner & Maj. Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 A.F. L.
REV. 1, 11 (2001) (citing W. Darrell Phillips, Int'l and Operations Law Div., Lecture at Air Force
Judge Advocate General School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.).
[Vol. 108
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perfidy. Finally, I will briefly address the status of unlawful combatants as they
relate to double-tapping.
A. Prohibitions on Unnecessary Suffering and Protections for the
Wounded
Necessary to an analysis of the laws of war applicable to double-tapping
is a brief understanding of their beginnings. Shooting into a wounded person
implicates both the protection of the wounded and sick and, to a lesser degree,
the prohibitions on unnecessary suffering. Focusing specifically on these two
concerns, the following section describes early efforts to protect the wounded
through the Lieber Code and the Geneva Conventions and efforts to reduce the
suffering in war made through the St. Petersburg Declaration and the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
1. The Lieber Code
Flagrant violations of then customary laws of war during the United
States Civil War fueled the development of the first codification of the modem
laws of war, embodied in the Lieber Code.45 The structure of the Lieber Code
was simple, but, as Lieber himself stated, was "pregnant and weighty like some
stumpy Dutch woman when in the family way with coming twins."'46 Commis-
sioned in 1863 by President Lincoln, the Code was a survey of the customary
laws of war by Dr. Francis Lieber. After its completion, President Lincoln is-
sued the Code as General Order Number 100 to govern the conduct of United
States forces during the war.4 7 Interestingly, the Code was subsequently
adopted by Great Britain, France, and Prussia to govern their armies.48
Although praised for its humane nature, the Lieber Code suffered from
an almost "open-ended definition of military necessity. 49 For example, under
military necessity, the Code validated such practices as the starvation of civil-
ians and the bombardment of civilians without warning. 50 Noting that the Lie-
45 See RICHARD S. HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 1 (1983) [hereinafter
"LimBER CODE"]. President Abraham Lincoln officially signed the Lieber Code for use of the
Union Army in April 1863. Id.
46 Id. at21.
47 See W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REv. 1, 7 (1990).
48 See Daniel Smith, New Protections for Victims of International Armed Conflicts: The Pro-
posed Codification of Protocol II by the United States, 120 MIL. L. REV. 59, 63 (1988). This
international acceptance and adoption proved to be auspicious, as Lieber had previously boasted
"that General Order No. 100 'will do honor to our country' and it 'will be adopted as a basis for
similar works by the English, French and Germans."' Id. (citing Letter from F. Lieber to General
Halleck (May 29, 1863) in Lieber's Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, California).
49 See Chris af Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History
of the Laws of War, 35 HARv. INT'L L.J. 49, 66-67 (1994).
50 HARTIGAN, supra note 45, arts. 15, 17, 19, 21.
20061
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ber Code happened to validate the practices of the Union Army, Confederate
Secretary of War James Seddon proclaimed the Lieber Code "a barbarous sys-
tem of warfare under the pretext of military necessity.",
51
In protecting the wounded, Article 60 of the Code contained an obliga-
tion for one party to a conflict to give its enemy quarter.52 As with the rest of
the Code, the obligation to give quarter was limited by military necessity. Arti-
cle 60 declared that "a commander is permitted to direct his troops to give no
quarter, in great straits, when his own salvation makes it impossible to cumber
himself with prisoners. 53 Although the obligation to take in the wounded did
contain the caveat for military necessity, Article 61 acted to provide some
minimal protection to "disabled" soldiers against attack.54 Specifically, Article
61 offered protection against those who gave no quarter, stating that "[t]roops
that give no quarter have no right to kill enemies already disabled on the
ground.
55
2. The Geneva Conventions
The birth of the Geneva Conventions dates back to 1859, shortly after
the Swiss, inspired by a businessman's account of sick and wounded soldiers in
France, created the International Committee of the Red Cross.56 In 1864, the
ICRC created the first Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.57 Article 6 of this Convention stated
that "[w]ounded or sick soldiers shall be entertained and taken care of, to what-
ever nation they may belong. ' 58 The Convention also provided for the protec-
tion of medical facilities and medical and religious personnel. 59 The protections
afforded to armies on land in the Convention of 1864 were extended to maritime
warfare in 1899.60
The Convention of 1864 was amended in 1906, adding the notion that
the wounded shall be "respected," a notion only implicit in the 1864 Conven-
51 Id. at 123.
52 Id. art. 60.
53 Id. art. 60.
54 See id. art. 61.
55 Id. art. 6 1.
56 Manooher Mofidi & Amy E. Eckert, "Unlawful Combatants" or "Prisoners of War": The
Law and Politics of Labels, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 62 (2003).
57 See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field, Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 1 Bevans 7 [hereinafter "Geneva Convention of 1864"];
G.I.A.D. Draper, The Development of International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 67, 70 (Jean Pictet ed., 1988).
58 See Geneva Convention of 1864, supra note 57, art. 6.
59 See id., arts. 1, 2, 6.
60 Convention (III) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva
Convention of 22 August 1864, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1827, 1 Bevans 263.
[Vol. 108
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tion's requirement that the wounded be "cared for.",6' The 1906 amendments
also extended protections beyond officers and soldiers to "other persons offi-
cially attached to the armies. 6 2 The 1907 Hague Regulations added protections
for prisoners of war, civilians, and neutral persons.63
The experiences of the seven million prisoners of war taken in World
War I revealed the shortcomings of the Hague Regulations-especially its regu-
lation of the conditions of captivity. In order to address these shortcomings, the
ICRC created the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War in
1929.64 In the same year, the ICRC further amended the protections for the
wounded and sick. While the Convention of 1864 obligated parties to care for
the wounded and the Convention of 1906 added the obligation to respect the
wounded, the Convention of 1929 added the obligation to treat the wounded
with humanity.65
Just as World War I revealed the shortcomings of the Hague Regula-
tions in regulating the treatment of prisoners of war and noncombatants, the
horrors of World War II revealed the weaknesses of the Geneva Conventions.
The conclusion of World War II brought the revision and codification of the
four Geneva Conventions in 1949.66 Following their adoption, it soon became
apparent that the character of war was beginning to change. Technological ad-
vancements, guerilla warfare, and growing numbers of civil wars all showed the
partial inadequacy of the Geneva Conventions. In order to address these prob-
lems, the ICRC invited states to supplement the Geneva Conventions. These
new provisions are embodied in Additional Protocols I and I.67 Protocol I ad-
61 See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded of the Armies in the
Field, art. 1, July 6, 1906, 35 Stat. 1885, 1 Bevans 516, 521 [hereinafter "Geneva Convention of
1906"]. Immediately thereafter, this Convention was extended to maritime warfare in the Con-
vention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, 1 Bevans 694.
62 See Geneva Convention of 1906, supra note 61, art. 1.
63 See Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regu-
lations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans
631 [hereinafter "Hague Regulations IV"]; Convention (V) respecting the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, 1 Bevans 654.
64 Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 2
Bevans 932.
65 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the
Field, art, 1, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, 2 Bevans 965.
66 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter "Geneva
I"]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
67 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125
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dresses the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts while Proto-
col II addresses the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.
Although the United States and many others are not parties to these Protocols,
the International Committee of the Red Cross recently completed a comprehen-
sive study of customary international law and found that most of the Additional
Protocols are now customary international law. 68 Among these rules, the prin-
ciple of distinction between combatant and civilian,69 the obligation to provide
quarter and to safeguard an enemy hors de combat,70 the obligation to respect
the fundamental guarantees of civilians and persons hors de combat,7I the obli-
gation to account for missing persons,72 and the prohibition on perfidy are all
customary international law.73
3. Preventing Unnecessary Suffering in War
International attempts at limiting the amount of unnecessary suffering in
war led to two important agreements: The St. Petersburg Declaration of 186874
and the Hague Convention of 1907.75 Both of these instruments reflected inter-
national efforts to control unnecessary suffering during wartime.
a. St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868
Czar Alexander II of Russia called for a conference in St. Petersburg to
"alleviate as much as possible the calamities of war., 76 Railing against the use
of "arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men,, 77 the Decla-
ration did little more than prohibit the use of exploding bullets, an unreliable
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
68 Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribu-
tion to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 175, 187-88 (2005).
69 Id. at 187.




74 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 101
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d rev. ed. 1988).
75 Hague Regulations IV, supra note 63.
76 See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
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weapon which was fast becoming obsolete.78 The famed prohibition against
unnecessary suffering could be overridden by military necessity.79 Just as in the
Lieber Code, this exception was a vague and undefined term that effectively
swallowed the prohibition against unnecessary suffering.8°
b. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907
The main humanitarian contribution of the Hague Regulations rested in
Article 23. The Article contained eight subsections relating to practices that
were "especially prohibited." The three provisions most germane to this analy-
sis stated that it was forbidden to "kill or wound an enemy who, having laid
down his arms, or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discre-
tion,' it was forbidden to "declare that no quarter will be given, 82 and it was
prohibited to employ "arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unneces-
sary suffering. 83 Article 22 also made a contribution to humanitarian law, de-
claring that "the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited. 84 Unfortunately, the humanitarian contributions of the Conventions
proved to be largely aspirational because of their failure to provide guidelines
for interpreting the meaning of either the prohibition against using unlimited
means or the prohibition of arms that caused "unnecessary suffering."
While the Hague Conference of 1907 was successful in codifying areas
of combat operations related to naval warfare, bombardment, and aerial warfare,
Article 23 is most germane to this analysis. The prohibition on killing an enemy
78 The bullets were of great danger to the user, and most countries had ceased manufacturing
them. See M. W. ROYSE, AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
WARFARE 131-32 (1928). The technology re-emerged, however, with the invention of aerial
warfare. In 1923, some of the parties to the St. Petersburg Declaration apparently recognized its
new-found value and proposed ending the "permanent" ban in the proposed Hague Rules of Air
Warfare, art. XVIII, Feb. 1923. Jochnick & Normand, supra note 49, at 66-67. See also Parks,
supra note 47, at 25-32; Jan Klabbers, Off Limits? International Law and the Excessive Use of
Force, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59, 65 (2006). The Hague Rules of Air Warfare can be
viewed at http://lawofwar.org/hague-rules ofair-warfare.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
79 See Jochnick & Normand, supra note 49, at 66-67
s0 One commentator found that no signatories to the St. Petersburg Declaration found a mili-
tarily useful weapon unfit for use because of the suffering it may have caused. See FRrrs
KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 30 (1987).
81 See Hague Regulations IV, supra note 63, art. 23(c).
82 Id. art. 23(d).
83 Id. art. 23(e). In the 1899 Convention, Article 23(e) used the phrase "superfluous injury"
instead of "unnecessary suffering" used in the 1907 Convention. See Convention (II) with Re-
spect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, art. 23(e), July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, - Bevans . The 1899
version of the Article suffered from the same shortcomings as the 1907 version, that is, "superflu-
ous injury" remained undefined. See id.
84 Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. XXII, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247.
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that no longer had a means of defense and surrendered is a precursor to ICRC
Rule 47, which would give protection to these same attackers and others recog-
nized hors de combat.
85
B. Modern Protections for the Wounded and Sick
As the laws of war relate to double-tapping, the most important consid-
eration lies in the protections afforded the wounded. The Lieber Code of 1863
and the Geneva Convention of 1864 both contained general protections for the
care of the wounded and sick. Articles 60 and 61 of the Lieber Code gave the
86basic rules for giving quarter to the enemy. Article 60 stated that it was
against the modem law of war to not give quarter, but, in "great straits, when his
own salvation makes it impossible to cumber himself with prisoners" a com-
mander can direct his troops to not give quarter.87 The 1864 Geneva Conven-
tion provided that "[w]ounded or sick soldiers shall be entertained and taken
care of, to whatever nation they may belong.,8 8 The 1906 revision added the
idea of respect for the wounded, and the 1929 revision protected the wounded
and sick with "four imperatives which had . . . defined the inviolability of the
wounded:" respect, protection, humane treatment and care. 89 The 1949 Confer-
ence left these four imperatives intact. 90
The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field sets out the current protections for the
wounded. 9' Specifically, it states that "[m]embers of the armed forces and other
persons specifically mentioned in the following Article, who are wounded or
sick, shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. 92 The Article con-
tinues, "[a]ny attempts upon their lives, or violence to their persons, shall be
strictly prohibited.,
93
On its face, this Article forbids double-tapping a solider who falls
within the category of wounded or sick. Shooting wounded combatants would
clearly be a violation of the Article's proscription on "attempts upon their
lives." 94 The difficulty, however, is in trying to determine if a combatant is
wounded and deserves the protections afforded by the Convention.
85 See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
86 See LIEBER CODE, supra note 45, arts. 60-61.
87 Id.
88 Geneva Convention of 1864, supra note 57, art. 6.
89 See JEAN S. PICTET, COMMENTARY I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 134-35 (1952).
90 See id.
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In Pictet's Commentary on the Convention, he stated that "[n]o attempt
has ever been made in the Geneva Convention to define what is meant by a
'wounded or sick' combatant." 95 Pictet further emphasized that any attempt to
define the severity of wounds or sickness that would trigger protection would be
futile.96 Doing so "would thereby open the door to every kind of misinterpreta-
tion and abuse. 9 7 For Pictet, deciding whether an attacker was sufficiently
wounded or sick for the purposes of protection was a matter of "common sense
and good faith." 98 The key deciding factor was whether combatants had put
down their weapons and had ceased to fight "as a consequence of what they
themselves think about their health." 99
Further guidance on defining whether a combatant is wounded or sick
can be found in the International Committee of the Red Cross's recent study on
customary international humanitarian law. In Rule 47, the ICRC states that any
attack on a person recognized hors de combat is prohibited.' ° A person hors de
combat is "anyone who is defenceless because of unconsciousness, shipwreck,
wounds or sickness."'' ° In order to be hors de combat, a person must also "ab-
stain[] from any hostile act and [] not attempt to escape."' 0 2 This definition in-
vites two interrelated questions. First, what does the term "recognised" mean on
the battlefield, and second, how does one tell if a combatant is truly "defence-
less."
As to the first question, Rule 47 includes three categories of people who
are hors de combat: anyone who is in the power of an adverse party; anyone
who is defenseless because of unconsciousness, shipwreck, wounds or sickness;
or anyone who clearly expresses an intention to surrender. 0 3 Of these three
categories, it may be assumed that the second and third were not meant to over-
lap entirely. In other words, those who are wounded and do not continue to
fight do not have to express a clear intent to surrender in order to be recognized
as hors de combat. Moreover, because the category containing the wounded
also includes those who are unconscious, any clear expression requirement can-
not logically apply to the second category. As wounded combatants may not be
able to manifest a clear intent to surrender due to their physical conditions, a
duty must attach to the attacking party to "recognise" combatants hors de com-
bat as a result of their wounds in certain cases.
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Placing the burden of recognition on the attacking party is consistent
with Article 12 of the Geneva Convention for the Wounded and Sick.' °4 Article
12 requires that an attacking party act affirmatively to protect the wounded. As
Pictet explained in his commentaries, "[t]here is a positive, as well as a nega-
tive, obligation: the wounded and sick must be given such medical care as their
condition requires.'
0 5
To be protected as a combatant hors de combat, the attacking party must
also determine that the wounded combatant is defenseless. °6 While there may
be many simple cases,'0 7 there are situations in which suicide bombers and
booby-traps abound.10 8 If an enemy uses these tactics, determining whether a
combatant is defenseless can be a deadly game. When and how a party is sup-
posed to make the determination and recognize that a combatant is hors de com-
bat is a question that Pictet would say is answerable only by "common sense
and good faith."' 9
C. Protections for the Dead
Double-tapping also implicates the protections afforded the dead in the
Geneva Conventions. Article 15 of the first Geneva Convention requiresparties
to a conflict to "search for the dead and prevent their being despoiled."" Arti-
cle 16 provides additional measures meant to ensure respect for and protection
of the dead. These measures include procedures for identification"' and report-
ing requirements. 1 2 Double-tapping may run afoul of these provisions insofar
as firing more bullets into a corpse to ensure that the person is in fact dead may
needlessly damage a corpse in contravention of Article 15. In fact, it may need-
lessly damage a corpse to the point where it is not possible to identify the person
in contravention of Article 16.
While not directly related to double-tapping, Article 17 helps to illus-
trate the breadth of protection offered the dead by the Conventions. Specifi-
cally, Article 17 addresses the procedures for disposal of the dead."13 If circum-
104 Geneva I, supra note 66, art. 12.
105 PiCTET, supra note 89, at 137.
106 See Henckaerts, supra note 68, at 203.
107 Rule 47 includes combatants who are unconscious. Id. Setting aside concerns about per-
fidy, this serves as an example of a simple case of recognition.
108 See Grange, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
"09 See PICTET, supra note 89, at 136.
110 Geneva I, supra note 66, art. 15.
'I Id. art. 16 ("Parties to the conflict shall record as soon as possible, in respect of each...
dead person of the adverse Party falling into their hands, any particulars which may assist in his
identification.").
112 Id. ("Parties to the conflict shall prepare and forward to each other through the ... bureau,
certificates of death or duly authenticated lists of the dead.").
113 Id. art. 17 ("They shall further ensure that the dead are honorably interred.").
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stances permit, this Article calls for a medical examination to confirm the death
and to help establish identity." 14 It limits the use of cremation for the disposal of
the dead to certain circumstances that must be declared." 5 Article 17 also calls
for parties to inter the dead, if possible, by their nationalities, to establish an
"Official Graves Registration Service" to aid in properly maintaining and mark-
ing graves so that they may always be found, to aid in exhumation for identifica-
tion purposes, and to aid repatriation.' 16
D. The Principle of Distinction
A party may intentionally attack any combatant or civilian who takes a
direct part in hostilities. A civilian cannot be a subject of double-tapping if he
or she has not entered into hostilities. 17 The ICRC rules state that Parties shall
distinguish between the civilian population and military targets and shall direct
their operations only against military targets. 1 8 As firing once into a civilian
who is not engaged in hostilities would violate this basic stricture, firing twice
clearly does.
Combatants, however, are legitimate subjects of double-tapping pro-
vided they are not recognized as hors de combat. To distinguish between com-
batants who are still engaged in combat, who are wounded, and who are dead is
to determine whether a combatant remains a legitimate target or now possesses
a protected status. Combatants who are engaged in hostilities are military objec-
tives and subject to the practice of double-tapping."19 Once a combatant ceases
hostilities by virtue of being captured, by wounds or sickness, or by surrender
they become persons hors de combat and are no longer legitimate subjects of
double-tapping.
20
In light of the present situation in the United States regarding "enemy
combatants," "detainees," and others suspected of operating with terrorist or-
ganizations it is necessary to briefly broach double-tapping with respect to those
in this status. The status of the "unlawful" or "unprivileged" combatant has
recently spurred much scholarly and popular debate.' 21 The debate rages on
114 Id.
115 The circumstances are limited to "imperative needs of hygiene" or for "motives based on the
religion of the deceased." Id.
116 Id.
117 Henckaerts, supra note 68, at 198, Rule 6.
118 Id. at 198, Rule 1.
119 Id. at 198, Rules 3, 4, 7.
120 Id. at 198, Rule 1; Robert Kogod Goldman, International Humanitarian Law: Americas
Watch's Experience Monitoring Internal Armed Conflicts, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 49, 75
(1993).
121 See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Com-
batants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891 (2002); Lawrence Azubuike, Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda
Soldiers: Another Viewpoint, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 127 (2003); Joshua S. Clover, Comment, Re-
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despite the fact that no treaty of international humanitarian law refers to the
category. For the purposes of this analysis, however, distinctions between
lawful and unlawful combatants need not be made. While the distinction may
be important for claiming prisoner of war status, it is much less important for
determining the lawfulness of the use of double-tapping against them.
123
According to ICRC Rule 47, any "attacking person" can be recognized
as hors de combat.124 This status would shield them from further attack, pro-
vided that the wounded attackers are not participating in hostilities. 25 The dou-
ble-tapping of a combatant, lawful or unlawful, who is wounded but still en-
gages in hostilities is legitimate under the laws of war.
E. The Prohibition of Perfidy
The prohibition of perfidy in warfare presents an important considera-
tion with respect to classification. The Lieber Code proclaimed that the com-
mon law of war allowed for capital punishment when one made clandestine or
treacherous attempts to injure an enemy because "they are so dangerous, and it
is so difficult to guard against them."' 126 The Hague Regulations continued to
outlaw treachery, declaring that "it is especially forbidden to ... kill or wound
treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation.' 27
A party to a conflict commits perfidy by "inviting the confidence of an
adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord,
protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with
intent to betray that confidence."' 128 Specifically, ICRC Rule 80 prohibits at-
taching booby-traps to persons entitled to special protection under international
member, We're The Good Guys": The Classification and Trial of the Guantanamo Bay Detainees,
45 S. TEX. L. REv. 351 (2004); David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al, It's Not Torture, and They Aren't Lawful
Combatants, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2003, at A19.
122 Knut Dormann, The Legal Situation of "unlawful/unprivileged combatants," 85 INT'L REV.
OF THE RED CROSS 46 (Mar. 2003).
123 The outline of the debate regarding the protections of unlawful versus lawful combatants
can be found by comparing Dormann, supra note 122, with Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants
and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 1025, 1028 (2004). Dormann relies on the U.S.
Military Manual for the Laws of Land Warfare (1956) and textual arguments from the Geneva
Conventions to support some protections for enemy combatants. Dormann, supra note 122, at 49-
51. Callen, on the other hand, finds that unlawful combatants "are not given the specific rights
detailed in the Convention." Callen, supra this note, at 1071.
124 Henckaerts, supra note 68, at 203, Rule 47.
125 See id.
126 LIEBER CODE, supra note 45, art. 101.
127 Hague Regulations IV, supra note 63, art. 23(b).
128 Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 37.
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humanitarian law. 129 Although the United States has not ratified Protocol I, it
views the Article 37 and 38 perfidy provisions as customary international law.
130
IV. DOUBLE-TAPPING IN CONTEXT: THUNDER RUN AND FALLUJAH
During Thunder Run, soldiers on their way to Baghdad described com-
batants who appeared to be dead or wounded re-engaging American soldiers.131
In the heat of the battle, it is not surprising that soldiers who observed these
actions would begin to shoot into the bodies of those that were wounded or ap-
peared dead. Significant numbers of combatants acted in such a way as to de-
ceive their enemy as to their status. This perfidious conduct violated the laws of
war, which resulted in a loss of any protected status. 132 Assuming that the
American forces distinguished between combatants and civilians as they ad-
vanced, the people who feigned death or injury were combatants. As combat-
ants without a protected status, they were lawful targets of double-tapping.
Of those who were actually wounded, the question is not as clear. Cer-
tainly those wounded combatants who began to re-engage in the battle were
legitimate targets.1 33 Those who were wounded, were defenseless, and did not
re-engage in the battle, however, were not eligible targets.134 Given perfect
knowledge of the status of these wounded, they should have been recognized as
soldiers hors de combat. 35 Although they should have been recognized as such,
the ICRC's "defenseless" standard is nearly impossible to evaluate during the
exigencies of battle.136 A soldier cannot be expected to be omniscient under
such circumstances, and, given the past practice of the enemy, it is not unrea-
sonable to believe that wounded combatants possessed weapons hidden from the
naked eye-such as small arms or booby-traps.
Assuming that the order to double-tap was given after significant num-
bers of combatants committed perfidious acts, it was legal under Pictet's com-
mon sense and good faith standard. 37 The enemy's ongoing use of deception as
to their status made it reasonable to believe that soldiers who appeared wounded
were still legitimate targets.
129 See Henckaerts, supra note 68, at 205, Rule 80.
130 UNITED STATES ARMY OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 5-2, 5-3 (Manuel E. F. Supervielle et
al. eds., 2000).
131 See Zucchino, supra note 17.
132 See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.
133 Henckaerts, supra note 68, at 198, 203, Rules 1, 47.
134 See id. at 203, Rule 47.
135 See Goldman, supra note 120, at 75.
136 See id.
137 See Pictet, supra note 89, at 136.
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It is also important to note that the commanding officer ordered his
troops to shoot those who were moving near a weapon. 138 While this order may
tend to legitimate double-tapping by only ordering its use against combatants
who were moving, it is unrealistic to believe that a combatants who falls be-
cause of wounds would have fallen anywhere but near his or her weapon. Such
a subtle distinction also implicates Pictet's common sense and good faith stan-
dard. Presumably, the order applied to those combatants who were moving near
a weapon with the implication that they intended to use it. A common sense and
good faith interpretation of the order should lead a soldier to avoid shooting
those wounded combatants who may have been moving but were not intending
to re-engage in hostilities.
39
Aside from shooting only those who moved near weapons, a general re-
sponse to perfidious conduct cannot extend to situations where it is clear that a
combatant is wounded and ceased hostilities or where a combatant is clearly
dead. 140 In operation, this clarity may only be evident in extremely close com-
bat or when one who is wounded can gain protection as hors de combat for
clearly expressing his or her desire to surrender. 141
A general perfidy justification for double-tapping is somewhat troubling
from the perspective of the Iraqi forces because it makes protections for
wounded soldiers somewhat moot. First, it punishes soldiers who may not be
committing perfidy for actions they did not perform. Second, if a soldier is
wounded, but the enemy can still engage him or her, there is little reason to sur-
render or otherwise give up fighting. While choosing to not surrender or fight
may not be troubling in and of itself, it may encourage wounded soldiers to util-
ize make-shift booby traps on their person because of the belief that one will die
regardless, harming those who later dispose of the dead.
The situation in Fallujah presents a similar problem. The enemy's pat-
tern of conduct created an expectation that the enemy was engaged in perfidious
acts.142 The soldier who shot the combatants was part of a unit that was recently
victimized by a booby-trapped body and there were reports of other incidents
where enemies faked wounds or death. 143
A close review of the facts sheds light on the legality of the soldier's de-
cision to shoot the wounded Iraqi combatants. First, it is important to note that
138 See Zucchino, supra note 17.
139 For example, a soldier should not shoot one who is not moving toward a weapon, but is
simply writhing in pain from severe wounds.
140 This assumes that Pictet's common sense and good faith standard, paired with the duty to
protect the wounded in both the Geneva Convention and the ICRC rules would demand recogni-
tion of attackers hors de combat in clear cases.
141 Henckaerts, supra note 68, at 203, Rule 47.
142 See Grange, supra note 15.
143 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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the marine in question was not aware that he was being recorded.144 This sup-
ports the notion that the marine's actions were spontaneous and unaffected by
the presence of the cameras.
The transcript states that the soldier, upon finding the wounded combat-
ant, shouted "he's faking he's f***ing dead."'145 This indicates that the marine
at least perceived a situation where an enemy soldier was planning a perfidious
act. Taking into account previous accounts of booby-trapped bodies, this is not
an unreasonable belief, but a real concern of many of the soldiers on the ground.
Running counter to this consideration is the journalist's report that there
did not appear to be any weapons on the scene and that the man who was alleg-
edly pretending to be dead did not make any sudden movements. 46 Assuming
that there may have been a hidden bomb and that the soldier was standing in
close proximity to the combatant, the lack of an obvious weapon or any sudden
movement did not necessarily dispel any risk of danger.
After the first man was shot, the second man raised his hands and was
spared. 147 If the marine actually believed that he was in danger and needed to
shoot the first man, his decision to spare the life of the second man seems to be
consistent with his initial fear of danger. Once the second man raised his hands,
the danger dissipated and the soldier did not shoot him.
A. Determination of Status as a Mark of Legitimacy
In Thunder Run, double-tapping became a response to a specific tactic
then employed by the enemy. Iraqi soldiers and other combatants began to
feign death and attack American troops. 148 This perfidy could only be met by
double-tapping. In the second case, however, the American soldier's response is
not as clear-cut. Although the marine that fired the fatal shots was not prose-
cuted, the question still remains whether his actions were justified under the
laws of war. Looking at the circumstances of his encounter, he was aware of the
deceptive tactics commonly used by the insurgents in Fallujah, and only a day
earlier the marine in question had been shot and another soldier in his unit was
killed by a booby-trapped body. 149
In the Thunder Run and Fallujah examples, what separates questionable
uses of double-tapping from clearly lawful ones is the status of the subjects:
combatant, wounded, or dead. A distinction must be made between what may
be the actual classification of a person on the battlefield and the split-second
144 James Glanz & Edward Wong, Cameraman Details Marine's Role in Mosque Shooting,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at Al.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See sources cited supra note 33.
148 See Grange, supra note 15.
149 See sources cited supra note 40.
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determination of classifications made by a soldier in combat. The Geneva Con-
ventions specifically state that the wounded must be protected., 50 Therefore,
double-tapping wounded combatants who are not participating in hostilities is a
violation of the law of war. As for the dead, a classification between combatant
and non-combatants is irrelevant because the Geneva Convention's protections
extend to all the dead.
1. The Resolution of Doubt as to Status
The realities of the battlefield reinforce Pictet's "common sense and
good faith" standard as the best standard for determining when double-tapping
is legitimate under the laws of war. If there is a question regarding a person's
status, the Geneva Conventions and the ICRC Rules provide little guidance as to
how to resolve that doubt. Additional Protocol I states that doubt should be
resolved in favor of civilian status when determining whether one is a civilian or
a combatant.15 1 This provision gives no guidance on what constitutes doubt,
however, and also does not provide for the resolution of doubts as to combatant
status.
The critical categorization that must be made in situations like those in
Thunder Run and Fallujah is not between civilian and combatant, but rather
between combatant, wounded, and dead. The Geneva Conventions are silent on
how soldiers are to resolve doubts about the status of combatants.
a. Resolving Doubt in Favor of Protection
On one hand, the same standard for the resolution of doubts about civil-
ian status should apply to the resolution of combatant versus wounded status.
That is, when there is doubt as to whether a combatant is wounded, dead, or still
engaged in hostilities, doubt should be resolved in favor of a protected status. A
principle that stands for "shoot first, ask questions later" violates the Conven-
tion's declaration that the wounded "shall in all circumstances be treated hu-
manely." 152 Unlike the Lieber Code, 153 the protections afforded to the wounded
and sick are not qualified by the dangerousness of the situation or any military
necessity standard-they apply to "all circumstances."'' 54 The Convention also
states that "violence to life and person" shall be "prohibited at any time and in
any place whatsoever.
''55
150 Geneva I, supra note 66, art. 12.
151 Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 50.
152 Geneva I, supra note 66, art. 3(1) (emphasis added).
153 LIEBER CODE, supra note 45, art. 60. ("[A] commander is permitted to ... give no quarter, in
great straits, when his own salvation makes it impossible to cumber himself with prisoners.").
154 Geneva I, supra note 66, art. 12.
155 Id. art. 3(1).
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Pictet stated that each party must protect the enemy wounded as it
would its own.156 "[E]ach belligerent must treat his fallen adversaries as he
would the wounded of his own army. This duty falls on every individual.' 57
These comments suggest that a soldier should resolve all doubt in favor of a
protected status as he would probably act to assist a wounded friend even if he
may have been unsure of his friend's injury. For instance, in the case of a friend,
a soldier does not face the possible dangers of not shooting again, rather, the
soldier has to decide whether to risk the possibility of danger in giving the po-
tentially wounded friend assistance. In both situations, friend or foe, the at-
tacker must assume risk to aid the potentially wounded person.
Finally, as civilians and wounded soldiers are both protected by the in-
herent structure of the Geneva Conventions both classes should be protected on
a similar basis--especially when a determination is critical to survival. If the
standard was not weighed in favor of protection it would enable soldiers to ig-
nore classifications too easily, claiming later that they were simply mistaken.
This would violate the spirit and overall purpose of the Convention's protections
for the wounded and sick.
b. Resolving Doubt in Relation to Danger
On the other hand, distinguishing between civilian and combatant may
be different in character than distinguishing between types of combatants.
When confronting combatants, a soldier faces people who are trained to act with
lethal force. This means that an encounter with a combatant is simply more life
threatening than one with a civilian.
Assuming for a moment that wounded civilians can be identified as
such on the battlefield, the risks they present are much reduced from the risks
that attackers may pose. This is especially the case when attackers are known to
feign wounds or death, or booby-trap dead bodies. As stated above, combatants
are trained to act with lethal force. Therefore, it can be argued that combatants
should not enjoy a presumption of protection because they are trained to attack,
have access to and knowledge of dangerous materials, and are simply more dan-
gerous than the a wounded civilian.
Finally, a textual argument can be made using the interpretive maxim
expressio unis est exclusio alterius. According to this tool, because Protocol I
expressly included a provision for the resolution of doubt when classifying be-
tween civilian and combatant, 158 the lack of such a provision in the other classi-
fications means that it was expressly excluded. In other words, doubt should be
resolved in favor of a protected status only when classifying a person between
combatant and civilian.
156 PICTEr, supra note 89, at 137.
157 Id.
158 See Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 50.
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While there are many arguments for and against double-tapping, the
laws of war clearly protect those who are hors de combat. In determining
whether an attacker is eligible for this protected status, the laws of war simply
cannot create a bright-line rule, especially given the special considerations of
each and every conflict. While Pictet's "common sense and good faith" standard
may be somewhat vague and difficult to apply, a flexible standard is needed to
address the exigencies of battle and to allow soldiers to adequately tailor their
tactical responses to specific enemy practices.
V. CONCLUSION
The Laws of War provide precious little guidance for the practice of
double-tapping. The most applicable standards involve the classification of
different potential targets between civilian and combatant, and, within combat-
ant, between the wounded and the dead. Although the classifications may be
clear on paper, they are not always clear on the battlefield.
Just as the situation in Iraq demonstrates, there can be many factors that
justify the use of double-tapping. The costs of not double-tapping can be
deadly, a soldier only has the benefit of a split-second to decide whether to dou-
ble-tap the seeming dead or wounded, and the common or individual practice of
the enemy are all circumstances that bear on the lawfulness of the act.
The laws of war must apply to and protect both sides of a conflict.
While wounded soldiers are offered protection through the laws of war, that
protection is lost through acts of perfidy and hostility. While those who are
clearly hors de combat should remain outside the scope of double-tapping, on a
battlefield where perfidy is common, double-tapping can encourage respect for
the laws of war and protection from the enemies' deceit. Assuming that a sol-
dier's decision is based on the existence of a reasonable threat, the realities of
the battlefield justify the lawfulness of double-tapping.
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